Over the past week there have been notable anniversaries of landmark events in two programs that are frequently cited as inspirational models for the necessary efforts to overcome our dependence on oil, the Manhattan Project and the Apollo program.  On July 16, 1945, at the Trinity test site near Alamogordo, New Mexico, the army tested the first atomic weapon, the design that was used in Nagasaki, Japan a few weeks later.  (The bomb design used on Hiroshima was considered so reliable that it was not tested in advance of its use.)  Twenty-four years later, on July 16, 1969, Apollo 11 was launched to the moon.  Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin first walked on the moon on July 20. 

These programs are frequently cited as examples of what the nation can accomplish if it makes a commitment to accomplishing a goal and are viewed as examples of the commitment currently needed to address energy security.

There is, however, a key difference between the goals of these programs and our current energy policies.  Each of these programs was intended to achieve a positive goal: building a nuclear weapon and landing a man on the moon and returning him safely home.  Our energy policies today, however, are rhetorically intended to reduce our dependence on foreign oil (a goal that is largely meaningless) but contain no positive goal.  We have not committed to what we want to do, only to what we do not want to do.  We have policies that support increasing fuel efficiency, that support biofuels, natural gas vehicles, hydrogen vehicles and electrification.  Yet, ultimately these paths are incompatible.  Moreover, at least in the short term, they are more expensive than the status quo, which explains why we are still using oil. 

While the costs of the alternatives are greater than the staus quo, they could be more viable in the long run, especially if one considers the costs that are not accounted for in oil use and the loss to the economy resulting from the oil producers’ exercise of oligopoly power.  Yet, we will never go down parallel paths to replace oil when each is more expensive than oil unless a decision is made to pursue such a path as a matter of national policy.  Further, by failing to annunciate a clear positive policy, we undermine possible public support for an energy policy by failing to explain clearly what we are trying to achieve.  And, given the challenge of sustaining public support for a new energy policy through periods of high prices (when such policies are on everyone’s minds) and period of low prices (when such policies are of little interest to the general public), failing to articulate such a goal is nearly fatal to the policy.

Partly for that reason, and primarily because it believes that electrification is the only viable policy, SAFE has promoted electrification of the short-haul transportation system and the goal around which we can build our energy policy.  Electrification can serve as a focal point for public support.  Moreover, nearly all other energy policies necessary to address security and climate are consistent with electrification. 

For nearly four decades we have floundered in the development of policies to enhance our energy policy to improve our economic and national security.  If we are going to solve the problem over the next three decades, the government must establish a clear policy with positive goals capable of generating public enthusiasm and support that can be sustained through periods of high and low prices.  Otherwise, we will still be trying to figure out how to approach the problem for the indefinite future.

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